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To fall under the spell of an object, to be touched by it, moved emotionally by a piece of art in
a museum, brought to tears of joy, to admire its forms of ingenuity, to like the artworks’ colors,
to take a photo of it, to let oneself be transformed by it: all these experiences—which are also
forms of access to knowledge—cannot simply be reserved to the inheritors of an asymmetrical
history.
Felwin Sarr and Bénédicte Savoy, 2018
1. Introduction
Colonial injustice is not a distant wrong that passes away with time.1 It is an everyday reality that
reproduces itself. Its ongoing effects are vividly illustrated by controversies of the return of cultural
colonial objects,2 the rise of the ‘Black Lives Matter’ movement, contemporary debates about the
concept of ‘race’ or the discourse over slavery-related monuments. In the course of the twentieth
century, ‘overt structures of colonialism were slowly dismantled’, but some of ‘its underlying prin-
ciples were implicitly reinforced’.3 Hannah Arendt has highlighted the structural synergies
between colonialism and twentieth century totalitarianism in the 1950s.4 The (after)life of colo-
nialism remains present in our relations to spaces, objects, persons or history.5
Few theories of justice have addressed the ongoing problems posed by the historical reality of
colonialism. Cases relating to colonial crimes have fallen outside contemporary understandings of
atrocity crime or law as an institution itself. Judge Pal, the only representative of the colonized
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1See S. Löytömäki, ‘The Law and Collective Memory of Colonialism: France and the Case of “Belated” Transitional Justice’,
(2013) 7 International Journal of Transitional Justice 205, at 222. See also J. Balint et al., Keeping Hold of Justice: Encounters
between Law and Colonialism (2020).
2See A. Tasdelen, The Return of Cultural Artefacts: Hard and Soft Law Approaches (2016); J. Van Beurden, Treasures in
Trusted Hands: Negotiating the Future of Colonial Objects (2017); A. Vrdoljak, International Law, Museums and the Return of
Cultural Objects (2006); E. Campfens, ‘The Bangwa Queen: Artifact or Heritage?’, (2019) 26 International Journal of Cultural
Property 75.
3Vrdoljak, ibid., at 193.
4H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), 123–5.
5See A. Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism (2000); F. Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (2008); D. Moses, Empire, Colony,
Genocide (2008); G. Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition (2014).
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world at Tokyo, openly criticized the failure of the tribunal to engage with ‘political domination’6
and the ‘plague of imperialism’ in its construction of international law in the aftermath of the
Second World War. He noted:
I do not see how we can shut our eyes to the period beyond an arbitrarily fixed limit. The
approach suggested : : : would afford an easy solution of all our bewilderment. But I am not
sure if it would lead us to anything which in the name of humanity we can call wholesome
and salutary.7
The non-Aligned movement has fought for over 50 years to end colonialism,8 but broader moves
to seek redress for slavery9 or colonial violations have been marginalized during decolonization
and the Cold War.10 Issues of justice or reparation were often sidelined in the path towards
independence and decolonization. The international legal system failed to engage with its own
past. This status quo affects the very identity of international society, including its proclaimed
universality, commitment to equality or narratives of progress. Failing to ‘deal properly with
historical injustice’ is ‘an injustice in itself ’.11
Over the past two decades, the need to engage with this chapter of the past has gained
broader public consciousness. Cities, universities and museums have started to engage more
critically with their colonial heritage (e.g., benefits from slave trade, naming of streets and public
spaces).12 In some cases, former colonial powers have expressed remorse or apologies for different
types of historical injustice.13 The Durban Conference stressed the link between historical wrong
and ongoing inequality and discrimination and advocated a development-based vision of compen-
satory justice.14 Specific episodes of colonial and post-colonial violence have been subject to investi-
gation or litigation in domestic courts, such as British atrocity in the Mau Mau uprising,15 Dutch
crimes in the decolonization of the East Indies (Rawagade, South Salawesi),16 the assassination of
6Pal criticized the selective focus on the ‘menace of totalitarianism’. See IMTFE, ‘Dissentient Judgment of Justice Pal’
(1999), at 117.
7Ibid.
8See J. von Bernstorff and P. Dann, The Battle for International Law: South-North Perspectives on the Decolonization Era
(2019); L. Eslava, M. Fakhri and V. Nesiah, Bandung, Global History, and International Law: Critical Pasts and Pending
Futures (2017). See also the Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States, Art. 16, GA Res. 29/3281 (XXIX), UN
Doc. A/RES/29/3281 (1974).
9On the origins see A. L. Araujo, Reparations for Slavery and the Slave Trade: A Transnational and Comparative History (2017).
See also J. Torpey,Making Whole What Has Been Smashed (2006); J. Torpey (ed.), Politics and the Past: On Repairing Historical
Injustices (2003); F. Brennan and J. Packer (eds.), Colonialism, Slavery, Reparations and Trade Remedying the ‘Past’? (2012).
10E. Barkan, The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices (2001).
11A. De Baets, ‘Historical Imprescriptibility’, (2011) 59/60 Storia della Storiographia 128, at 149.
12For instance, the University of Glasgow recognized that it received ‘significant financial support’ from slavery in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and made a plan for reparatory justice. Postcolonial associations have been formed
in various German cities, such as Berlin postcolonial, Hamburg postcolonial. For museum practices, see inter alia
NMVW, ‘Return of Cultural Objects: Principles and Process’ (2019).
13See R. Brooks, ‘The Age of Apology’, in R. Brooks (ed.), When Sorry Isn’t Enough: The Controversy over Apologies and
Reparations for Human Injustice (1999), at 3–11; T. Bentley, Empires of Remorse (2016).
14World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, Declaration and
Programme of Action (2002), Art. 158. See E. Tourme-Jouannet, ‘Reparations for Historical Wrongs: The Lessons of
Durban’, in E. Tourme-Jouannet (ed.), What is a Fair International Society? (2013), at 187–201.
15C. Elkins, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya (2005).
16See E. de Volder and A. de Brouwer, The Impact of Litigation in relation to Systematic and Large-Scale Atrocities com-
mitted by the Dutch Military Forces in the ‘Dutch East Indies’ between 1945–1949 (2019); L. van den Herik, ‘Addressing
“Colonial Crimes” through Reparation? Adjudicating Dutch Atrocities committed in Indonesia’, (2012) 10 JICJ 693;
N. Immler and S. Scagliola, ‘Seeking justice for the mass execution in Rawagede’, (2020) 24 Rethinking History 1.
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Lumumba and the kidnapping of mixed-race children (Métis),17 or the claims of Herero and Nama
against Germany’s massacre in Namibia.18 Contemporary initiatives, such as the 2013 CARICOM
Plan for Reparatory Justice,19 the 2018 Sarr and Savoy report on restitution of cultural heritage,20
EU resolutions on looted art, and changing museum practices21 illustrate that the ongoing structural
and relational dimensions of colonial injustice require novel attention.22
On 17 June 2020, UN High Commissioner of Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, openly criti-
cized ‘the failure to acknowledge and confront the legacy of the slave trade and colonialism’ in the
Human Rights Council Urgent Debate on current racially inspired human rights violations.23 She
combined this with a plea ‘to make amends for centuries of violence and discrimination, including
through formal apologies, truth-telling processes, and reparations in various forms’.24 However,
state discourses on apologies, reparatory justice or engagement with colonial history remain over-
shadowed by colonial amnesia, different readings of the past or reluctance to remedy wrong.25
This editorial seeks to address the schizophrenic role of international law towards colonial injustice.
It builds on the rich tradition of this journal in relation to the colonial foundations of international
law and post-colonial approaches, including in recent years (e.g., Hébié,26 Sellars,27 Strecker,28
Tzouvala,29 Nuzzo,30 and Giladi31). It argues that international law needs a fresh relational under-
standing in order to engage critically with its own foundations and decolonize its own structures.
It first addresses the dual role of international law as culprit and remedy and false dichotomies in
discourses on reparatory justice. It then introduces relational theories, which offer new frames for
reparatory justice. It concludes with some thoughts on how to re-think international law from a
relational perspective, in order to enable more responsible engagement with the colonial past.
17In the parliamentary inquiry, Belgium acknowledged moral, but no legal responsibility. A criminal investigation in rela-
tion to Lumumba’s death was opened in 2011. See H. Hintjens and S. Cruz, ‘Continuities of violence in the Congo: Legacies of
Hammarskjöld and Lumumba’, in C. Stahn and H. Melber (eds.), Peace Diplomacy, Global Justice and International Agency
(2014), at 216–37. In April 2019, the Belgian Prime Minister issued an apology in relation to the treatment of the Métis chil-
dren under Belgian colonial rule.
18J. Sarkin, Colonial Genocide and Reparations Claims in the 21st Century (2008); H. Melber, ‘Germany and Namibia:
Negotiating Genocide’, (2020) Journal of Genocide Research, available at doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2020.1750823.
19CARICOM Reparations Commission, ‘10-Point Reparation Plan’ (2014).
20F. Sarr and B. Savoy, ‘The Restitution of African Cultural Heritage: Toward a New Relational Ethics’, November 2018,
available at restitutionreport2018.com/sarr_savoy_en.pdf.
21EU Parliament, Cross-border restitution claims of works of art and cultural goods looted in armed conflicts and wars,
Res. 2017/2023 (2019).
22See also M. Moran, ‘The problem of the past: How historic wrongs became legal problems’, (2019) 69 University of
Toronto Law Journal 421.
23Statement by Michelle Bachelet, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 43rd session of the Human Rights Council
Urgent Debate on current racially inspired human rights violations, systemic racism, police brutality against people of African
descent and violence against peaceful protests, 17 June 2020.
24Ibid.
25On redress see D. Butt, Rectifying International Injustice: Principles of Compensation and Restitution Between Nations
(2009).
26M. Hébié, ‘Was There Something Missing in the Decolonization Process in Africa?: The Territorial Dimension’, (2015)
28 LJIL 529.
27K. Sellars, ‘Meanings of Treason in a Colonial Context: Indian Challenges to the Charges of “Waging War against the
King” and “Crimes against Peace”’, (2017) 30 LJIL 825.
28A. Strecker, ‘Indigenous Land Rights and Caribbean Reparations Discourse’, (2017) 30 LJIL 629.
29N. Tzouvala, ‘A False Promise? Regulating Land-grabbing and the Post-colonial State’, (2019) 32 LJIL 235.
30L. Nuzzo, ‘The Birth of an Imperial Location: Comparative Perspectives on Western Colonialism in China’, (2018)
31 LJIL 569.
31R. Giladi, ‘The Phoenix of Colonial War: Race, the Laws of War, and the “Horror on the Rhine”’, (2017) 30 LJIL 847.
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2. The dual face of international law
The current international architecture is marked by a paradox. It has been built on the basis of
the power relations and social structures of the past. It is at the same time discredited by it.32
As Anthony Anghie,33 B. S. Chimni34 or Sundhya Pahuja,35 and most recently, the UN Special
Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related
intolerance, Tendayi Achiume, have emphasized, international law has ‘played a central role in
consolidating and furthering global structures of racial domination and discrimination’.36
Colonialism marked an objectionable structure of governance and political relation that was
justified through questionable moral claims (e.g., the ‘three Cs’ of colonialism: Civilization,
Christianity, and Commerce37) and legal justifications.
Colonial powers gained control through a combination of coercion and partly ‘voluntary’ and
partly ‘contrived’ consent.38 Colonial structures involved domination, exploitation, alienation, and
identity-taking. They changed the way in which groups and indigenous populations understood
and organized their individual and collective lives.39 Colonial law served as an instrument of dis-
cipline, coercion (e.g., French code de l’indigénant) or social transformation, including the trans-
formation of local customary law, but it also established limits to colonial power and opportunities
for resistance to its control. Race and ethnicity formed the basis of indirect rule. Standards of
civilization were modelled after structures of government, law and administration of colonial
powers. Social hierarchies and institutional structures denied ‘equal and reciprocal terms of coop-
eration’.40 Colonialism has thus been rightly qualified as a form of ‘structural historical injustice’
by Catherine Lu.41 It involved not only wrongdoing by specific individuals or states, but had a
strong international and transnational dimension.42 It relied on ‘social structural processes that
enabled and even encouraged individual or state wrongdoing, and produced and reproduced
unjust outcomes’.43 Its detrimental consequences remain visible until the present.
Many newly independent states struggled to build independent economies during and after
decolonization and remained subject to other, less direct forms of outside control that go beyond
their choice, such as colonial debt or currency dependency, external corporate control or exploi-
tation of natural resources. A large number of contemporary conflicts44 or migration patterns45
have their origins in physical, cultural, and psychological damage caused by decades or centuries
of colonial rule.
32J. Zimmerer, Von Windhuk nach Auschwitz? Beiträge zum Verhältnis von Kolonialismus und Holocaust (2011), 32.
33A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (2012); A. Anghie, ‘Towards a Postcolonial
International Law’, in P. Singh and B. Mayer (eds.), Critical International Law: Postrealism, Postcolonialism and
Transnationalism (2014), 123.
34B. S. Chimni, ‘The Past, Present and Future of International Law: A Critical ThirdWorld Approach’, (2007) 27Melbourne
Journal of International Law 499.
35S. Pahuja, Decolonizing International Law (2011).
36Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and racial
intolerance, UN Doc. A/74/321 (2019), para. 18.
37The three Cs are reflected in Rudyard Kipling’s poem ‘White Man’s Burden’ (1899).
38See A. Loomba, Colonialism-Postcolonialism (1998), 31.
39R. Bhargava, ‘How Should We Respond to the Cultural Injustice of Colonialism?’, in J. Miller and R. Kumar (eds.),
Reparations: Interdisciplinary Inquiries (2007), 215, at 217.
40L. Ypi, ‘What’s Wrong with Colonialism’, (2013) 41 Philosophy & Public Affairs 158.
41C. Lu, ‘Colonialism as Structural Injustice: Historical Responsibility and Contemporary Redress’, (2011) 19 Journal of
Political Philosophy 261. See also D. Butt, ‘Repairing Historical Wrongs and the End of Empire’, (2012) 21 Social & Legal
Studies 227; K. Tan, ‘Colonialism, Reparations and Global Justice’, in J. Miller and R. Kumar (eds.), Reparations:
Interdisciplinary Inquiries (2007), 280.
42The colonial experience and the process of decolonization have differed across former colonies. However, colonialism
cannot be understood only through national experiences.
43See Lu, supra note 41, at 262.
44On Rwanda see M. Mamdani,When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda (2001).
45E. Tendayi Achiume, ‘Migration as Decolonization’, (2019) 91 Stanford Law Review 1509.
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International law in the wider sense, including international political and legal institutions and
structures, have played a conflicting role. Law is both a culprit and a potential remedy. It makes
colonialism ‘speakable and unspeakable’ at the same time.46 It has been used to legitimize empire
and colonial exploitation. Throughout colonial history, natural law and ethnic and racial distinc-
tions were used to legitimize colonialism. Native legal claims and local contestations and forms of
resistance were often suppressed through domination and dispossession.47 In the nineteenth
century, theories of socio-cultural progress were used as pretexts to justify colonial imperialism
(‘Scramble for Africa’) and commercial expansion as civilization or protection (e.g., Berlin
Conference).48 Divisions endured under the Mandates System of the League of Nations and
beyond.49 International law upheld racial hierarchies and social divisions.50 Equality remained
a fiction. Contemporary norms or silences render colonial violence invisible. Concepts such as
intertemporal law, lack of legal personality or statutes of limitations are used to bar claims for
reparatory justice. International criminal justice promotes resistance towards oppression, but it
approaches injustice predominantly through victim/perpetrator divides that reduce complexity.
At the same time, however, international law also opens pathways towards transformation.51
It cannot ‘change the past’, but it is a means to transform the way in which agents relate to it.
It may counter past silences and recognize historical injustices and biases (e.g., oppressive and
racialized structures) and change contemporary discourses or domestic practices through the
expressive function of law.52 Adjudication is not necessarily only a reconstruction of the past
or a means to preserve or entrench traditional understandings. It may entail a transformative
process which recreates historical objects, links or subjectivities.53 Quasi-judicial bodies, such
as commissions of inquiry or truth and reconciliation mechanisms, can help challenge traditional
narratives, offer alternative legal qualifications of past conduct or identify ways to overcome
biases.
In light of the divergent interests of states and the reluctance of former colonial powers
to engage with reparations claims, it remains difficult to reach a binding legal agreement.
However, some normative change occurs incrementally, through less formal processes, such as
practices in the field of human rights (e.g., indigenous rights), cultural heritage law, transitional
justice (access to justice) or soft law instruments (e.g., UN Principles Basic Principles and
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation). Notions, such as race or civilization have
become subject to critical scrutiny, both in policy and law.54 UNESCO has emphasized since the
1950s that ‘race’ is ‘not so much a biological phenomenon’ but rather a ‘social myth’.55 The
European Race Directive distanced itself expressly from theories ‘which attempt to determine
46See S. Edelbi, ‘Making Race Speakable in International Criminal Law’, (2020) 16 TWAILR: Reflections, at 8.
47S. Belmessous (ed.), Native Claims: Indigenous Law against Empire, 1500–1920 (2011).
48See, e.g., J. Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law (1894), 141; Vrdoljak, supra note 2, at 47–51.
49See, e.g., A. Anghie, ‘Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-century International Law’,
(1999) 40 Harvard International Law Journal 1. On UN administration see C. Stahn, Law and Practice of International
Territorial Administration (2008); E. De Brabandere, Post-conflict Administrations in International Law (2009); R. Wilde,
International Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission Never Went Away (2008).
50See M. Koskenniemi, ‘Race, Hierarchy and International Law: Lorimer’s Legal Science’, (2016) 27 EJIL 415.
51On change through law see W. Veraart, ‘Uitzondering of precedent? De historische dubbelzinnigheid van de Rawagede-
uitspraak’, (2012) 61 Ars Aequi 251.
52On expressivism as method see C. Stahn, Justice as Message (2020).
53On the re-theorization of the state see R. Parfitt, The Process of International Legal Reproduction (2019).
54See UNESCO, Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice, adopted by the General Conference at its 20th session,
27 November 1978, Art. 2 (Any theory which ‘bases value judgements on racial differentiation, has no scientific foundation
and is contrary to the moral and ethical principles of human’). See M. Mutua, ‘Critical Race Theory and International Law:
The View of an Insider-Outsider’, (2000) 45 Villanova Law Review 841.
55UNESCO, Statement on Race, Paris, July 1950, in UNESCO, ‘Four Statements on the Race Question’ (1969), 33. On race
in international criminal justice see C. Lingaas, The Concept of Race in International Criminal Law (2019).
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the existence of separate races’ in its definition of ‘racial origin’.56 Colonial remnants, such as the
discrimination between civilized and uncivilized nations (e.g., Article 38 of the ICJ Statute) have
been silently abandoned in legal practice.57 Legal approaches towards time, agency, and cultural
objects are becoming open to alternative readings through litigation, practice, and
scholarship. Solutions for colonial injustice must be sought, both within and outside the law.
3. False binaries and objections to redress
Colonial injustice requires a wide range of forms of redress, including moral, political, legal or
cultural forms of redress. Structurally, it is more difficult to address than other forms of historical
injustice.58 It covers a large historical time span, ranging roughly from the early sixteenth century
to the latter half of the twentieth century. Not every form of injustice relates to colonial violence.
Colonial history includes very different periods of colonization and forms of control or domina-
tion (e.g., land-taking, political domination, cultural imposition or economic exploitation).59 They
involve different types of injustice,60 such as deprivation of rights or entitlements, unjust exclu-
sions, forms of unjust enrichment (e.g., episodes of exploitation), or rule-based systemic or struc-
tural wrongs.61 They require different forms of transformative justice (e.g., corrective, restorative,
distributive or reconciliatory justice).
The passage of time makes it difficult to identify victims and perpetrators. The strength of
claims may fade with the supersession of people and their rights and obligations over time.
Harm and violence are not only state-driven. Non-state actors, such as companies (e.g., the
Dutch East India Company) or missionaries, have played an ambivalent role in colonial
injustice. Some of them were, directly or at least indirectly, agents of colonialism.62 In many cases,
the nexus between original wrongdoing and present-day reality is transformed or broken through
intervening factors. Corrective justice is thus often difficult in legal terms. However, these
obstacles do not preclude redress for colonial injustice. Many contemporary objections to repar-
atory approaches are based on shaky premises or distinctions (e.g., moral vs. legal responsibility,
contemporary vs. remote historical injustice, impossibility of relief, responsibility of past vs.
present generations).
Many states or actors recognize moral responsibility or political forms of redress as part of a
reparative approach towards wrongdoing (apology, forgiveness, contrition, atonement, and rec-
onciliation), but shy away from approaches which would imply any legal recognition of wrong, in
56See EU Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000, at preamble, para. 6.
57See A. Pellet, ‘Article 38’, in A. Zimmermann and C. J. Tams (eds.), Statute of the International Court of Justice:
A Commentary (2019), at 836. See also Judge Ammoun’s Separate Opinion in North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment of
20 February 1969, [1969] ICJ Rep. 1969, 3, at 100 and 133 (‘the term “civilized nations” is incompatible with the relevant
provisions of the United Nations Charter’). On the use of ‘civilization’ as argumentative pattern see N. Tzouvala,
Capitalism as Civilisation (2020). On a transcivilizational account see O. Yasuaki, International Law in a
Transcivilizational World (2017).
58See generally J. Thompson, Taking Responsibility for the Past: Reparation and Historical Justice (2002). On obstacles see
J. Waldron, ‘Superseding Historical Injustices’, (2014) 103 Ethics 4.
59M. Craven, ‘Colonialism and Domination’, in B. Fassbender and A. Peters (eds.), Oxford Handbook on History of
International Law (2012), 862.
60David Miller has suggested a correspondence-based theory of responsibility, in order to recognize the complexity of
historical injustice. See D. Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (2007), 138.
61For a typology see J. von Platz and D. A. Reidy, ‘The Structural Diversity of Historical Injustices’, (2006) 37 Journal of
Social Philosophy 360.
62O. Kalu, The History of Christianity in West Africa (1980), 183; A. Johnston,Missionary Writing and Empire, 1800–1860
(2009), 13–37; C. River Editors, The Dutch East India Company and British East India Company: The History and Legacy of the
World’s Most Famous Colonial Trade Companies (2016). See also G. Baars, The Corporation, Law and Capitalism (2019).
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order to avoid precedents.63 Acts of repair are presented as an act of solidarity, development or
care. For instance, the use of development aid to make up for colonial harm marginalizes wrong-
doing. The practice of offering cultural colonial objects on loan to societies of origin portrays
temporary return as an act of gratitude, rather than as something that is owed. This logic has
self-serving and patronizing features. It reverses roles: Former colonial powers appear as generous
benefactors, while former colonized societies are presented as objects of charity.
The exclusive focus on moral responsibility implies that law has nothing to say about colonial
injustice and its continuing legacies. The turn to morality overlooks the fact that certain types of
colonial injustice were already prohibited according to the standards at the time, such as laws
and customs of warfare, principles of humanity or protective duties regarding administered pop-
ulations under the Final Act of the 1885 Berlin Conference64 or protectorate agreements. It also
poses a fundamental justice dilemma. Colonialism was legally constructed. Colonial injustices
cannot necessarily be resolved by relying on the very laws that caused them. Law was implicated
in creating structural conditions of injustice, but it is not only a tool of domination and suppres-
sion. It should be revisited in order to have a stake in undoing them. It is thus rightly emphasized
that post-colonial engagement with colonial injustices requires a decolonization of international
law itself.65
A second false binary is the distinction between different types of historical injustice based on
the physical existence of offenders or survivors. Contemporary forms of historical injustice, such
as the holocaust, are deemed to be open to legal redress for individuals because some of the per-
petrators or (direct and indirect) victims are still alive,66 while other types of historical injustice are
excluded because perpetrators and (direct and indirect) victims have deceased.67 This agent-
related understanding neglects the structural nature of colonial injustice. It restricts redress to
inter-personal relations and liability structures. It disregards the fact that colonial injustice results
often not so much from the injustice done between particular persons, but rather from the struc-
tures of abuse or the institutional systems put in place at the time.68 It is necessary to differentiate
assessment of persons (e.g., individuals, groups) and assessment of actions.69 As Wouter Veraart
has aptly noted, ‘[u]ndoing cases of colonial injustice means addressing a past based on a legalized
structure of racial inequalities and deeply entrenched patterns of deliberate and ruthless exploi-
tation of human subjects and destruction of their cultural and ecological environments’.70
This is inter alia recognized in the context of transatlantic slavery. For example, Max Du Plessis
has argued that reparations might be useful to address ‘the legacy of enslavement, rather than to
try and redress the historical injustice itself’.71
A third false objection is the impossibility of relief (e.g., indeterminacy thesis).72 Reparation or
damages would be impossible to quantify or explode the limits of the law, since they involve
63For instance, Australia apologized to the ‘Stolen Generations’ in 2008, but refused to accept legal responsibility. See
J. Thompson, ‘Collective Responsibility for Historic Injustices’, (2006) 30 Midwest Studies in Philosophy 154, at 160.
64See General Act of the Berlin Conference on West Africa, 26 February 1885, Art. 6.
65See also Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 36, para. 58; Anghie, ‘Towards a Postcolonial International Law’,
supra note 33.
66For instance, Dinah Shelton has identified several factors which influence the award of reparations: They include
(i) whether the perpetrator is identifiable and living, and (ii) whether victims, or their immediate descendants, are identifiable
and living. See D. Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (2015), 277.
67De Baets, supra note 11, at 132.
68C. Moon, ‘“Who’ll Pay Reparations on My Soul?” Compensation, Social Control and Social Suffering’, (2012) 21 Social
and Legal Studies 187, at 194.
69See Butt, supra note 25.
70W. Veraart, ‘Beyond Property: A Reflection on the Value of Restitution of Looted Cultural Objects’, 2020, SSRN Electronic
Journal, available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3524852.
71M. du Plessis, ‘Historical Injustice and International Law: An Exploratory Discussion of Reparation for Slavery’, (2003)
25(3) Human Rights Quarterly 624, at 651.
72Waldron, supra note 58.
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injuries or suffering over centuries. This argument neglects the reality of reparative processes. In
cases of historical injustice, justice is even more than in other contexts an approximation.
Reparative practices move away from restitutio in integrum towards lump sum agreements, col-
lective forms of reparations or measures to address the structural causes of violence or victimiza-
tion. This is inter alia reflected in post-Second World War peace agreements or the commitment
to a ‘just and fair’ solution in relation to restitution of Nazi-looted art in the Washington
Conference.73 In cases of colonial injustice, reparatory practices may be used to address ongoing
causes and consequences, rather than symptoms. Developments in transitional justice, which are
grounded in international legal norms (e.g., access to justice, right to truth) illustrate that repar-
atory justice can have a truth-telling function, clarify the past, express empathy or a ‘society’s
commitment not to forget or deny that a particular injustice took place’, and to respect and help
sustain a dignified sense of identity in memory for the people affected.74 Reparation for colonial
injustice is both an offer ‘to repair the relation’ and a means to satisfy a ‘demand for truth’.75
A fourth critique relates to the intergenerational dimensions of redress.76 It would be unfair to
burden current generations with the duty to repair the wrong of past generations, in particular to
provide compensation: present generations should not be required to atone for or repair ‘the sins
of earlier ones’.77 This argument may apply in relation to the responsibility of individuals, but
it does not apply to the same extent to responsibilities of legal persons, such as states and
corporations which continue to exist.78 Contemporary structures are able to take into account
intergenerational considerations. It is wrong to conflate redress with compensation, as suggested
in popular discourse. As Ruti Teitel has noted, with the passage of time, ‘reparatory projects move
farther from the traditional model of corrective justice’79 and towards transformative processes.80
Addressing distributive inequalities and the structures that colonial injustice created becomes
more central. Contemporary responsibility may thus relate not so much to an undoing of the past,
but to recognition of wrong,81 and the duty to put an end to the reproduction of injustices.
4. Relational justice theories
Relational theories offer more nuanced models to address dilemmas of colonial injustice. They
connect justice to consciousness about the continuing effects of colonial injustice in the present
and the transformation of contemporary engagement with history and the past in social
relations.82 Transformation is necessary not only because of the need to remedy wrong, but to
create structural changes that prevent the reproduction of inequalities or harms.
Relational theories come in different variations. For example, Iris Young has developed a social
connection model of responsibility.83 Her approach places the emphasis on social responsibility
to others, rather than liability based on agency, guilt or fault for a harm. According to her, the
aim should not be solely to repair relations between an offender and a victim, but rather to address
the underlying structures of injustice and to renew social relations. This theory is able to
73Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, 3 December 1998, Principles 8 and 9.
74Waldron, supra note 58, at 6.
75Sarr and Savoy, supra note 20, at 40.
76See generally J. Thompson, Intergenerational Justice: Rights and Responsibilities in an Intergenerational Polity (2013).
77C. Kukathas, ‘Who? Whom? Reparations and the Problem of Agency’, (2006) 37 Journal of Social Philosophy 330, at 331.
78See L. Moffett and K. Schwartz, ‘Reparations for the transatlantic slave trade and historical enslavement: Linking past
atrocities with contemporary victim populations’, (2018) 36 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 247, at 262.
79R. Teitel, Transitional Justice (2002), 141.
80P. Gready and S. Robins, ‘From Transitional to Transformative Justice: A New Agenda for Practice’, (2014) 8
International Journal of Transitional Justice 339.
81De Baets, supra note 11, at 149.
82As Paul Ricoeur has noted, peoples, groups and individuals define their identity not only through status and cultural
bonds, but also through history and memory. See P. Ricoeur, La mémoire, l’histoire et l’oubli (2000).
83I. Young, ‘Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model’, (2006) 23 Social Philosophy and Policy 102.
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accommodate the collective and intergenerational dimensions of colonial injustice. Contemporary
agents are not per se blamed for all the wrong in the past (e.g., guilty of wrong), but rather held
responsible for remedying present injustices that are enduring.84 This model opens doors for
forms of responsibility that are not grounded in agency-based liability (e.g., responsibility without
culpability) and oriented towards future-oriented redress. It offers a constructive way to go beyond
the narrow confines of individual responsibility which may reduce colonial injustice easily to per-
sonal wrongdoing, but it also has weaknesses from a justice perspective since it may marginalize
legal responsibility for past wrongs or leave accountability blind spots through its focus on ongo-
ing violations.85 The longer the harm dates back, the more tempting it becomes to base responsi-
bility on social connection arguments, such as unjust enrichment.
Other theorists rely on discursive or restorative features of justice processes and procedures in
order to address the dynamics of colonial injustice. For instance, Janna Thompson has supported a
reconciliatory approach towards historical injustice,86 which involves shared forms of responsi-
bility ‘to bring about a more just social order’.87 Reparatory justice should be geared towards
co-operation and establishment of trust. One critique of this approach is that it fails to provide
a basis for reparative claims in cases where a ‘harmonious relationship now exists between the
nations or peoples concerned’.88
Others again stress the participatory dimensions of justice and argue that colonial injustice
should be addressed in dialogical terms,89 namely through open and transparent structures of
discourse that allow for contestation, debate and diverse perspectives, including non-Western
views. They acknowledge that social interaction may not necessarily bring closure about the past,
but provide a voice to unheard communities, transform the way in which the past is narrated,90
or promote recognition, empowerment or mutual engagement through a process in which each
side has to give way in an effort to reach ‘fair and just solutions’.91
Felwine Sarr and Bénédicte Savoy have developed a transformative relational justice model in
relation to cultural colonial objects. These objects have often ‘become diasporas’ through colonial-
ism. Sarr and Savoy argue that these objects are the very ‘mediators of a relation that needs to
be reinvented’.92 Acts of restitution are thus not only an attempt to address property relations
(e.g., return to the ‘rightful property owner’) or a gesture recognizing wrongdoing, but rather
a process of ‘re-activating a concealed memory’ and restoring the ‘signifying, integrative, dynamic,
and mediating functions’ of cultural heritage within contemporary societies.93
These relational theories offer an opportunity to re-think legal engagement with colonial injus-
tice. Legitimate claims for reparatory justice may be grounded in two elements, a wrong of the past
and the present connection to structural injustice, i.e., enduring norms, institutions, discourses,
material conditions, and social hierarchies. The relational approach implies a responsibility to be
conscious of relationships to spaces, persons or in the reproduction of wrong. This involves
backwards-looking elements, such as a duty to affirm, recognize or remember past wrongs
(e.g., through historical inquiry, truth-finding, memorialization), and transformation of the status
84See also C. Lu, Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics (2017), 161. On the concept of enduring justice see
J. Spinner-Halev, Enduring Justice (2012).
85On responsibility for crimes as composite acts see ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Art. 15.
86Thompson, supra note 58.
87J. Thompson, ‘Collective Responsibility for Historical Injustices’, (2006) 30 Midwest Studies in Philosophy 154, at 167.
88See K. Dunn, ‘A Sorry Challenge’, (2003) Australian Book Review 59.
89A. Bottoms and J. Tankebe, ‘Beyond Procedural Justice: A Dialogic Approach to Legitimacy in Criminal Justice’, (2013)
102 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 119.
90See I. Young, Responsibility for Justice (2011), 182.
91A. van Mourik, ‘How to Acknowledge Colonial Injustice?’, Interview with Nicole Immler 26 February 2019, available at
www.ind45-50.org/en/how-acknowledge-colonial-injustice-interview-nicole-immler.
92Sarr and Savoy, supra note 20, at 39.
93Ibid.
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quo, i.e., remedying the continued experience of structural injustice through proper processes94
and prevention of perpetuation.
The application of relational approaches entails both, legal and extra-legal dimensions.
It requires norms and institutions to recognize wrong, flexible mechanisms of inquiry and redress,
as well as societal engagement to change narratives and discourses about the colonial past
(e.g., presentation of alternative histories, contextualization of colonial acts or objects).
5. Towards a ‘post-colonial international law’
Law plays an ambivalent role in redress. It continues to face skepticism, due to its historical biases,
its ability to entrench injustices of the past, its selectivity and limited access, or its perception
as a form of domination or power, but it is at the same time a potential instrument to mitigate
colonial injustice. This is recognized in theories of ‘critical legalism’95 and partly reflected in
contemporary litigation and practice. As Judge McCombe noted in theMau Mau case, ‘[t]he time
must come when standing by and doing nothing, by those with authority and ability to stop the
abuse, becomes a positive policy to continue it’.96
Redress may not only be grounded outside, but also within the law. This requires transforma-
tion. Both, non- or quasi-judicial procedures (e.g., inquiry, investigation, search for truth,
and reconciliation), as well as classical legal procedures (e.g., reparation, restitution) require guid-
ance on the proper classification of past conduct, in order to make reliable findings or provide
meaningful recognition of wrong to victims, survivors or descendants. International law remains
imperfect in this regard. For many violations, that qualify as international crimes today, there is
not necessarily a corresponding legal label according to the standards of the time. Colonialism as
such has not been recognized as a crime.97 The historically ‘correct’ application of the law may be a
perpetuation of past injustice.
Scholars like Mari Matsuda have shown that traditional concepts, such as wrong, causation or
remedy require a differentiated understanding in relation to types of historical injustice which
continue to produce stigma and economic harm.98 However, many of the limits that law imposes
in its present form are not insurmountable, but connected to choices. For instance, theories of
causation involve value judgment. States can abstain from invoking statutes of limitations in pro-
ceedings. Concepts of timeliness and time may be adjusted in the context of repair of systemic
historical injustice since the very structure and type of injury may have prevented earlier claims.
Court litigation is only an option of last resort and not always well-suited to remedy harm, but
it may in some cases have a useful role in highlighting gaps or deficits of domestic systems or
mobilizing social imagination.99 For instance, in a case concerning French responsibility for colo-
nial slave trade and slavery in Martinique, brought by two associations (International Movement
for Reparations Martinique, Word Council of the Pan-African Diaspora) under the French
Taubira Law, a French Court dissociated the issues of responsibility and liability.100 It rejected
94S. Amighetti and A. Nuti, ‘David Miller’s theory of redress and the complexity of colonial injustice’, (2015) 8 Ethics &
Global Politics 1, at 9.
95M. J. Matsuda, ‘Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations’, (1987) 22 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil
Liberties Law Review 323.
96Mutua v. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, [2011] EWHC 1913 (QB), High Court of Justice, 21 July 2011, para. 144.
97In 2019, the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls in Canada recognized the
destruction of indigenous peoples as ‘colonial genocide’. See National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous
Women and Girls, ‘Supplementary Report, A Legal Analysis of Genocide’ (2019), at 9.
98Matsuda, supra note 95, at 398.
99M. Bessone, ‘The Colonial Slave Trade, Slavery and Structural Racial Injustice in France: Using Iris Marion Young’s Social
Connection Model of Responsibility’, (2019) 20 Critical Horizons 161. See also H. Duffy, Strategic Human Rights Litigation:
Understanding and Maximising Impact (2018); ECCHR, ‘Colonial Repercussions: Namibia’ (2019), available at www.ecchr.eu/
fileadmin/Publikationen/ECCHR_NAMIBIA_DS.pdf.
100Tribunal de Grande Instance de Fort de France, Judgment, No R.G. 05/1995, at 25.
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a legal duty to repair, but confirmed that the state has a shared responsibility for slave trade and
slavery and a duty to guarantee lasting memory (duty of memory). Court cases can thus have an
important demonstrative or expressive function in relation to colonial injustice, even if remedies
against the state or specific individuals remain limited. They may contribute to the emergence of
‘multidirectional memories’,101 bring out unexpected connections between different types of his-
torical wrong or create novel relational spaces to contemplate justice.102
In contemporary practice, modest changes in approach can be witnessed in relation to three
themes: the interplay between justice and time, the conceptualization of agency, and the relation-
ship towards cultural colonial objects.
Dilemmas of perpetuating colonial injustice through reliance on laws of the past may be
mitigated in three ways: contextual interpretation of past norms, recourse to evolutive
interpretation103 or the recognition of exceptions to the inter-temporal rule.104 For instance, it
may be appropriate to recognize certain limits to the application of the intertemporal rule
(e.g., jus cogens norms), as suggested by some ICJ judges in the case of Land and Maritime
Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria,105 or to extend the spirit of the Radbruch formula
to colonial injustice.106
The Dutch jurisprudence on reparation in the Rawagede, South-Sulawesi and East Java cases
has challenged the traditional view that claims regarding historical injustice are per se barred by
evidentiary obstacles.107 It concerned only specific episodes of violence in the path towards decol-
onization, but confirmed an important principle, namely that domestic legislators may be barred
by virtue of international legal principles and considerations of fairness and good faith, to silence
all consequences of the colonial past through statute of limitations. The limits of statutory lim-
itations regarding historical injustice were confirmed by two historic rulings of the Hague Court of
Appeal in 2019.108 They clarified essential elements of the ‘reasonableness and fairness’ test,
namely the ‘exceptional nature of the unlawful conduct’109 (or better: the serious nature of the
crimes), state knowledge and failure to act (e.g., violation of due diligence/duty of care),110
and unfairness of a strict application of the period of limitation towards the claimant (e.g., de
facto impossibility for the claimant to seek access to justice for a long period of time, existence
of state immunity before foreign courts).111 The rulings compelled the Dutch government to
assume responsibility and express apologies, as a follow-up of legal proceedings.112
Approaches towards legal subjectivity are evolving. Colonial practices marginalized the identity
of colonial entities. They involved a dual form domination: they treated people as objects of
colonial will, i.e., as entities lacking equal status, and then re-made them as subjects. However,
101M. Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization (2009).
102N. Immler, ‘Human Rights as a Secular Social Imaginary in the Field of Transitional Justice’, in H. Alma and
G. Vanheeswijck (eds.), Social Imaginaries in a Globalizing World (2018), 193, at 212.
103M. Goldmann and B. von Loebenstein, ‘Alles nur geklaut? Zur Rolle juristischer Provenienzforschung bei der Restitution
kolonialer Kulturgüter’, (2020) MPIL Research Paper Series No. 2020-19, at 6.
104On the role of interpretation in framing international law see I. Venzke,How InterpretationMakes International Law: On
Semantic Change and Normative Twists (2012).
105Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening),
Judgment of 10 October 2002, [2002] ICJ Rep. 2002, 303, Separate Opinion of Judge Ranjeva, para. 3.
106A. Buser, ‘Colonial Injustices and the Law of State Responsibility’, (2017) 77 ZaöRV 409, at 432–3.
107L. van den Herik, ‘Reparation for Decolonisation Violence: A Short Overview of Recent Dutch Litigation’, (2018) 78
ZaöRV 629, at 632–3.
108Children of executed men in South-Sulawesi v. The Netherlands, Case no. 200.243.525/01, 1 October 2019, The Hague
Court of Appeal; Heirs Java torture victim v. The Netherlands, Case no. 200.247.634/01, 1 October 2019, The Hague Court of
Appeal.
109Children of executed men in South-Sulawesi, ibid., para. 15.2.
110Ibid., para. 15.3
111Ibid., para. 15.4.
112Volder and de Brouwer, supra note 16, at 62–3.
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the status of international law regarding legal personality of non-state entities in the colonial era is
more complex than assumed. Many colonial entities (tribes, chiefdoms, kingdoms etc.) had their
own organically grown forms of self-government and social rules organizing society. Some entities
exercised forms of sovereignty that do not conform with Eurocentric political
systems (e.g., tribal sovereignty). In many settler colonial contexts (e.g., US, Canada, New
Zealand, Australia), treaty processes are used as a means to address historical grievances, support
mutual recognition or create space for belated nation-building (e.g., Uluru Statement from the
Heart).113
New historical research in international law suggests that local political entities enjoyed at least
relative international legal personality throughout colonial history. As Mamadou Hébié has
shown, many agreements concluded in the colonial expansion of Africa created binding legal obli-
gations for both parties and rights opposable to other colonial powers.114 This practice indicates
that statehood was not necessarily a condition sine qua non for the recognition of legal personality
and that local entities were deemed to enjoy treaty-making capacity in certain contexts (e.g.,
conferral of titles to sovereignty).115 In light of this, it does not always make sense to require that
the interests of a people are mediated through the state in negotiations or claims.116 A legitimate
interest of peoples or groups to participate and be heard may flow from other norms, such as
self-determination, equality or non-discrimination or cultural rights.117 This is inter alia recog-
nized in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.118
Perspectives on ownership and return of cultural colonial objects are evolving. Many artefacts
are ‘witnesses to history’ (Walter Benjamin).119 They tell a story of the past or represent history
and culture of societies. Restitution and reparation are a means to reconstitute dignity, transform
relations towards objects and turn societies of origin from history’s objects into subjects.120
According to a relational view, claims for restitution of objects to societies of origin, or different
forms of ownership, may not only be justified by the wrong of the past (e.g., unlawful taking
according to the standards of time), but grounded in the inherent link between people and cultural
heritage and their ability to develop their own cultural identity. This argument has been made
in different variations: the entitlement of a state to have access to the ‘keys to its history’
(e.g., removal of Parthenon Marbles from Greece during the former Ottoman Empire),121 the link
between a people’s right of self-determination and cultural identity (e.g., return of Venus of
Cyrene to Libya),122 and human rights-based approaches which seek to protect the dignity
113See A. Cobb, ‘Understanding Tribal Sovereignty: Definitions, Conceptualizations, and Interpretations’, (2005) 46
American Studies 115. See also H. Hobbs, ‘Treaty making and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples:
Lessons from Emerging Negotiations in Australia’, (2019) 23 International Journal of Human Rights 174.
114For example, the Herero entered into protection treaties with Germany in 1885 and 1890.
115M. Hébié, ‘The Role of the Agreements Concluded With Local Political Entities in the course of French Colonial
Expansion in West Africa’, (2015) 85 British Yearbook of International Law 21, at 89.
116On the Herero negotiation see S. Harring, ‘German Reparations to the Herero Nation: An Assertion of Herero
Nationhood in the Path of Namibian Development’, (2002) 104 West Virginia Law Review 393.
117On art restitution see J. von Bernstoff and J. Schuler, ‘Wer spricht für die Kolonisierten? Eine völkerrechtliche Analyse
der Passivlegitimation in Restitutionsverhandlungen’, (2019) 79 ZaöRV 553, at 576–7.
118UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 13 September 2007, Art. 18.
119See also L. V. Prott (ed.), Witnesses to History – Documents and writings on the return of cultural objects (2009).
120See Sarr and Savoy, supra note 20, at 32.
121Webb v. Ireland [1988] I.R. 353, at 383, High Court of Justice;Government of Iran v. Barakat Galleries Ltd, [2007] EWCA
Civ 1374, 29 March 2007, para. 2. On the Parthenon marbles see generally G. Robertson, Who Owns History? (2020).
122The Italian Council of State held that the right to self-determination protects ‘the identity as well as the historic and
cultural heritage linked to the territory of each state or anyhow belonging to a population subjected to foreign domination’.
See Consiglio di Stato, Associazione nazionale Italia Nostra Onlus c. Ministero per i beni e le attività culturali et al., Decision
No. 3154/2008, 23 June 2008, para. 4.4, translation by F. Lenzerini, ‘Italy’, in T. Kono (ed.), The Impact of Uniform Laws on the
Protection of Cultural Heritage (2010), 439, at 462.
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and property of persons, including the cultural identity of groups and communities (e.g. Benin
Bronzes).123
The human rights-based reading of cultural heritage is the most innovative approach. It treats
objects not merely as cultural property or commodities but also recognizes their human dimen-
sion and connection to the identity and development of individuals and communities of origin.
It is inter alia reflected in the UNESCO Declaration on the Intentional Destruction of Cultural
Heritage,124 the ASEAN Declaration on Cultural Heritage125 or the Council of Europe’s
Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society (Faro Convention).126
It enables a ‘social connection’-oriented approach towards colonial injustice. Under this approach,
the ‘disconnection which may occur between cultural heritage and the people concerned’ becomes
an ‘important human rights issue’ of its own.127 The key question is not so much whether acqui-
sition of ownership or removal of objects was lawful at the time, but rather whether the contem-
porary lack of connection to objects by certain heritage communities constitutes a social condition
which requires redress.128
These approaches are the first steps towards an overdue decolonization of international law.
International law should not be treated as a ‘sacred source of authority’, but rather as part of a
particular ‘historically and geographically situated tradition’.129 Contemporary developments,
such as the protests of the ‘Black Lives Matter’ movement, the deconstruction and de-heroization
of colonial monuments, the ongoing demand for apology or reparations and challenges to the
exclusive guardianship role of international museums130 serve as a reminder that many effects
of colonial injustice are still felt as ongoing and real by individuals, peoples and communities.131
One of the challenges of the next decades is to confront structural injustices more openly and
decisively and to develop foundations of a ‘post-colonial international law’, not only in the field
of justice and accountability, but also in many other fields (e.g., migration, international economic
law, state succession).132 Transitional justice may need to be understood in a new relational way in
relation to colonial injustice, namely as a means to transform unjust into just relations.
123See Campfens, supra note 2, at 98 et seq.
124UNESCO Declaration on the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage (2003), preamble.
125ASEAN Declaration on Cultural Heritage (2000), preamble.
126Faro Convention, preamble.
127Report of the independent expert in the field of cultural rights, Farida Shaheed, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/38 (2011), para. 14.
128Campfens, supra note 2, at 106.
129See F. Mégret, ‘The MMIWG report: A Call for decolonizing international law itself’, The Conversation, 9 June 2019,
available at theconversation.com/the-mmiwg-report-a-call-for-decolonizing-international-law-itself-118443.
130See the 2002 Declaration on the Value and Importance of Universal Museums, signed by 18 large Western museums.
131Tourme-Jouannet, supra note 14, at 197.
132C. Lu, ‘Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Structural Transformation’, (2018) 11 Ethics & Global Politics 42, at 52.
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